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Introduction
In  May  2004,  ten  countries  are  due 
to  join  the  European  Union.1  They  are 
therefore  obliged  to  join  the  European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt the euro 
as their national currency.2 Most of them, 
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moreover,  have  been  eager  to  do  that. 
None  of  them  sought  an  opt-out  of  the 
sort  that  Britain  and  Denmark  obtained 
in 1991, when the Maastricht Treaty was 
drafted.3 Membership in EMU is not au-
tomatic,  however,  because  the  accession 
countries must first satisfy the precondi-
tions contained in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Although those preconditions are rigorous, 
and some of the accession countries are 
still far from meeting them, most of those 
countries have indicated that they want to 
enter EMU at the earliest possible date. 
One  of  the  preconditions  for  enter-
ing  EMU  is  that  the  accession  countries 
achieve  exchange  rate  stability.  To  this 
end, they must participate for two years 
in  an  exchange  rate  mechanism  known 
as ERM II, under which they must limit 
fluctuations in the euro values of their na-
tional currencies. They cannot permit their 
currencies to rise or fall by more than 15 
percent from an agreed central rate vis-à-
vis the euro. Because of this two-year re-
quirement, the accession countries cannot 
enter EMU before 2007.
On  May  20,  2003,  however,  Pedro 
Solbes,  the  European  commissioner  for 
1 Eight are Central European countries: the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; the other two are 
Cyprus and Malta. This policy brief concentrates 
on the first eight, but much of the analysis applies 
equally to the other two.
2 Although the acronym EMU stands for Economic 
and Monetary Union, it is widely used to stand for 
European Monetary Union, and that it is how it is 
used in this policy brief.
3 The Maastricht Treaty (also known as the Treaty on 
European Union) was signed in February 1992 and 
entered into force in November 1993. It amended the 
Treaty establishing the European Community and is 
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economic  and  monetary  affairs,  said  that  the  ac-
cession countries would have to meet a stricter ex-
change rate test. He told reporters in Prague that the 
European Commission had decided some years ago 
to assess the achievement of exchange rate stability 
by asking whether the accession countries had kept 
their exchange rates within the 21⁄4 percent band 
that  was  the  “normal”  band  under  the  exchange 
rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, 
now  known  as  ERM  I,  which  prevailed  when  the 
Maastricht Treaty was drafted, rather than the 15 
percent band of ERM II itself.4
This policy brief urges the European Commis-
sion  to  reconsider  its  position.  The  commission’s 
decision to use the narrow exchange rate band of 
ERM I rather than the wide band of ERM II derives 
from an overly rigid interpretation of the sensible 
principle  that  all  EU  countries  should  be  treated 
equally. It does not take account of the fundamen-
tal  difference  between  the  conditions  prevailing 
when the Maastricht Treaty was drafted and those 
prevailing today. This brief does not claim that the 
accession countries are different in ways that would 
justify differential treatment. It argues instead that 
the  economic  environment  is  different  now  that 
EMU is in being. Failure to take account of this dif-
ference when applying the principle of equal treat-
ment may have grave consequences. It may expose 
the accession countries to the risk of exchange rate 
crises that could damage them severely and further 
delay their entry into EMU. It may also complicate 
4 Quoted by Reuters News on May 20, 2003. It should be noted 
that the European Commission’s findings on this and other 
preconditions for EMU entry are advisory. The commission and 
the European Central Bank (ECB) must submit reports to the 
Council of Ministers, which has then to decide whether a coun-
try has qualified for entry.
Box 1. The Convergence Criteria 
Under Article 122 of the Treaty establishing the 
European  Community,  the  European  Commis-
sion  and  the  European  Central  Bank  must  re-
port every two years to the Council of Ministers 
on  each  Member  State  not  yet  admitted  to  the 
monetary union, assessing that Member State’s 
progress in fulfilling the requirements for admis-
sion.
The  requirements  are  listed  in  Article  121 
and  two  protocols  annexed  to  the  Treaty—the 
protocol  on  the  convergence  criteria  and  the 
protocol on the excessive deficit procedure. Ar-
ticle 121 requires that each country’s domestic 
legislation satisfy the requirements of the Treaty 
and the Statute of the European System of Cen-
tral Banks and that the country achieve “a high 
degree of sustainable convergence” measured by 
four criteria:
• the achievement of a high degree of price 
stability,  which  the  protocol  on  the  conver-
gence criteria interprets as meaning “an aver-
age rate of inflation, observed over a period of 
one year before the examination, that does not 
exceed by more than 11⁄2 percentage points that 
of, at most, the three best-performing Member 
States in terms of price stability.”
•  the  sustainability  of  the  government  fi-
nancial  position,  which  the  protocol  inter-
prets  as  meaning  that  the  Member  State  is 
not currently the subject of a decision by the 
Council  of  Ministers  that  it  has  an  excessive 
deficit. Pursuant to Article 104(c) and the pro-
tocol  on  the  excessive  deficit  procedure,  the 
Council of Ministers must employ two criteria 
to determine whether a Member State has an 
excessive  budget  deficit:  (a)  whether  the  gov-
ernment’s planned or actual deficit exceeds 3 
percent of GDP, unless the ratio has declined 
substantially and continuously and come close 
to  that  reference  value  or,  alternatively,  the 
excess  over  the  reference  value  is  only  ex-
ceptional and temporary, and (b) whether the 
government’s debt exceeds 60 percent of GDP, 
unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and 
approaching the reference value at a satisfac-
tory pace.
•  the  observance  of  the  normal  fluctua-
tion margins provided for by the exchange 
rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System, for at least two years, without de-
valuing against the currency of any other 
Member State, which the protocol qualifies by 
recasting the last clause: the country shall not 
have devalued its currency on its own initiative 
during the two-year period.
• the durability of convergence . . . and . . . 
participation in the exchange rate mecha-
nism being reflected in the long-term inter-
est rate level, which the protocol interprets as 
meaning “an average nominal long-term inter-
est rate that does not exceed by more than 2 
percentage  points  that  of,  at  most,  the  three 
best-performing  Member  States  in  terms  of 
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ing to fiscal sustainability, borrowed its deficit and 
debt  criteria  from  Article  104  of  the  Maastricht 
Treaty,  under  which  individual  countries  may  be 
cited and sanctioned for running “excessive” budget 
deficits.5  The  third  criterion,  discussed  at  length 
later, was meant to achieve exchange rate stability 
during the run-up to EMU, with the dual aims of 
confirming each country’s commitment to price sta-
bility (which, of course, is required for long-lasting 
exchange rate stability) and of precluding disconti-
nuities in the transition to the euro.
Many writers on EMU have criticized these con-
vergence criteria. It has been noted, for example, 
that the long-term interest rate is an imperfect in-
dicator of a country’s commitment to price stability; 
the behavior of a country’s long-term interest rate is 
bound to reflect market participants’ expectations 
regarding the country’s chances of entering EMU, 
as well as their expectations about future inflation. 
The case for imposing an exchange rate criterion is 
even weaker. It asks a country to prove that it can 
maintain a stable exchange rate in order to enter 
The European Commission’s decision to 
use the narrow exchange rate band of ERM 
I rather than the wide band of ERM II 
fails to take into account the fundamental 
differences between the conditions 
prevailing when the Maastricht Treaty was 
drafted and those prevailing today.
severely their ability to satisfy another precondition 
for EMU entry—the price stability criterion.
This  brief  begins  by  describing  the  precondi-
tions  that  the  new  EU  members  must  satisfy  in 
order to enter EMU and the original rationale for 
them, and it develops more fully the important dis-
tinction just mentioned—the need to distinguish be-
tween conditions prevailing when EMU was not yet 
in being and those prevailing today, now that EMU 
is in being. Thereafter, we propose modifications in 
the preconditions for EMU membership, including 
the  exchange  rate  requirement.  Finally,  we  weigh 
the policy options open to the accession countries if 
those preconditions are not modified. 
Qualifying to Enter EMU
The primary objective of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) is to maintain price stability. That was 
agreed at Maastricht in 1991. It was also agreed, 
however, that the task of achieving price stability 
should not be left to the ECB. It should be assigned 
instead  to  the  member  countries,  as  the  price  of 
entering  the  monetary  union,  and  most  of  those 
countries were far from achieving it in 1991. In the 
previous year, the annual inflation rate exceeded 10 
percent in two EU countries and exceeded 5 percent 
in  three  others.  No  country  had  an  inflation  rate 
lower than 2.5 percent. Furthermore, five countries 
had budget deficits larger than 5 percent of GDP, 
while four had stocks of public debt larger than 90 
percent of GDP, and these conditions were deemed 
to pose a serious threat to the future functioning of 
the monetary union. Lax fiscal policies could skew 
the policy mix by forcing the ECB to pursue a very 
tight monetary policy, and they might even threaten 
the ability of the ECB to maintain price stability; a 
debt crisis in a member country would put pres-
sure on the ECB to monetize that country’s debt or 
cope with the banking crisis that could follow a debt 
crisis.
Accordingly, Article 121 of the Maastricht Treaty 
set out four “convergence criteria” by which to judge 
the eligibility of individual countries to enter EMU 
(box 1). As the membership of EMU could not be 
known until eligibility had been determined, it was, 
of course, impossible to draft the criteria with refer-
ence to economic conditions in what is now known 
as the euro area. Therefore, the first and fourth cri-
teria, pertaining to price stability and the long-term 
interest rate, used as their benchmarks the national 
inflation rates and long-term interest rates of the 
“three best-performing Member States in terms of 
price stability,” while the second criterion, pertain-
5 The much-discussed Stability and Growth Pact aims at clarify-
ing and tightening the excessive deficit procedure, and it also 
commits each EU country to achieve and maintain a budget 
“close to balance” over the medium term. There have been many 
proposals for reforming the excessive deficit procedure and 
the Stability and Growth Pact, reflecting the realization that 
they can force governments to adopt strongly procyclical fiscal 
policies; see, e.g., Sapir et al. (2003). If they are reformed, the 
principle of equal treatment, discussed later, should not prevent 
the European Union from applying the amended rules to the 
accession countries when judging their eligibility to enter EMU. 
That is because the fiscal criterion shown in box 1 asks whether 
a member country is subject to a formal finding that it has an 
excessive deficit, and the standards used for that purpose must 
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a monetary union in which it will cease to have an 
exchange rate of its own.6
A  larger  question,  however,  is  more  relevant 
here:  Should  the  accession  countries  be  made  to 
replicate  the  work  of  the  original  EMU  members 
now  that  EMU  is  up  and  running  and  the  ECB 
has  taken  over  the  task  formerly assigned  to  the 
national central banks of the euro area countries? 
When EMU was not yet in being, it made sense to 
base the inflation-rate and interest-rate criteria on 
the track records of the three EU countries with the 
lowest inflation rates. Now that EMU is in being, it 
would make far more sense to base those criteria 
on the average inflation rate and average long-term 
interest rate in the whole euro area.7
 The European Commission has insisted repeat-
edly on strict adherence to the principle of equal 
treatment without taking account of the point just 
made. It insists that the accession countries must 
meet the same requirements for EMU entry as those 
that have already entered. Equal treatment, howev-
er, should not mean identical treatment. It can and 
should mean equivalent treatment, taking account 
of  the  changes  in  the  institutional  and  economic 
environment brought about by the creation of EMU 
itself.8  The  European  Commission  came  close  to 
acknowledging the validity of this distinction in its 
convergence report for Greece, the only country to 
enter EMU after it came into being:
It seems desirable that the assessment of a “high 
degree of price stability” should also take into 
consideration the price performance of the euro 
area as a whole as well as the ECB’s definition 
of price stability. This is all the more so since 
the euro and the euro area economy constitute 
the economically relevant benchmarks to which 
countries aiming to join the euro should orient 
their  convergence  efforts  (European  Commis-
sion 2000).
But the European Commission ducked the issue, 
saying that it might be relevant to future use of the 
convergence criteria but had no practical bearing on 
the eligibility of Greece. In fact, it ducked a lesser 
question: whether the existence of EMU calls for a 
small but sensible change in the way that the “three 
best  performing  countries”  are  selected.  Because 
there was no way to know initially which countries 
would qualify to enter EMU, they had to be chosen 
from the whole EU membership, not from the small-
er EMU membership. 
Consider, moreover, the possible consequences 
of using the original convergence criteria, especially 
the one pertaining to price stability, when deciding 
whether  a  new  EU  member  is  ready  to  enter  the 
EMU.  Although  the  single  monetary  policy  of  the 
ECB imposes strict limits on national inflation rates 
within the euro area, it does not align them perfectly. 
In June 2003, the inflation rate for the whole euro 
area was 2 percent. If that same rate were used as 
the benchmark for the convergence criterion repro-
duced in box 1, a country would be precluded from 
entering EMU if it had an inflation rate higher than 
3.5 percent. In that same month, however, the three 
“best performing” EU countries (Germany, Austria, 
and  Britain)  had  inflation  rates  averaging  just  1 
percent. Hence, use of the original convergence cri-
terion could prevent a country from entering EMU if 
it had an inflation rate higher than 2.5 percent—a 
rate that is not very far above the one used by the 
ECB as its measure of price stability—and a rate 
lower than the ones actually reported by five euro 
Failure to take account of the difference in 
conditions (now that EMU is in being) may 
expose the accession countries to the risk 
of exchange rate crises that could damage 
them severely and further delay their entry 
into EMU. 
6 It can perhaps be argued that two years of exchange rate 
stability offer prima facie evidence that the prevailing exchange 
rate is at or near the long-term equilibrium rate and is therefore 
one at which a country can safely substitute the euro for its 
own national currency. But this rationale is flawed. It assumes 
implicitly that the exchange rate would have been equally stable 
and at the same level had it been floating freely rather than 
being constrained to remain within the narrow band imposed 
by ERM I. Furthermore, it ignores the stabilizing effect of likely 
EMU entry—the belief by market participants that a country 
will soon enter EMU at its existing exchange rate. Finally, it 
wrongly treats the past as prologue; the absence of large shocks 
in the two-year period of exchange rate stability does not neces-
sarily foretell the absence of large shocks in the years ahead.
7 Begg et al. (2003) and Jiri Jonas (“Absurd Inflation Criterion 
for New EU Members,” Financial Times, July 14, 2003) make the 
same point. Buiter and Grafe (2002) go further: As a monetary 
union is the means par excellence for achieving inflation conver-
gence, requiring prior inflation convergence for EMU entry puts 
the cart before the horse. See also Balcerowicz (2003).
8 Wyplosz (forthcoming 2004) makes the same point, but he 
puts equal emphasis on the change in the environment and on 
the economic differences between the original candidates for 
EMU membership and the accession countries. The former, he 
says, had already achieved a great deal of real convergence and 
had therefore to focus mainly on nominal convergence, whereas 
the accession countries must do both. He argues, however, that 
EMU membership will foster the real convergence of the acces-
sion countries, because monetary integration will promote trade 
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9 Balcerowicz (2003) draws an interesting comparison between 
the nominal convergence achieved thus far by the accession 
countries and the convergence achieved by Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain at a “comparable” point in time—four years be-
fore they entered EMU. He finds that most of the accession 
countries are closer now to meeting the convergence criteria. 
Consider, for example, the price stability criterion: Spain’s 
inflation rate, at 4.6 percent, was lower than those of Greece 
and Portugal four years before entering EMU. In June 2003, 
however, six of the eight accession countries had inflation rates 
below 4.6 percent.
area countries in June 2003 (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal,  and  Spain).  The  point  of  this  example, 
however, is not to show how EMU entry might be 
made easier for the accession countries; it is instead 
to show why mechanical adherence to equal treat-
ment could have effects that were surely unforeseen 
when the convergence criteria were drafted.
The  same  exercise,  however,  raises  another 
question. How far are the accession countries from 
meeting the convergence criteria listed in box 1? Ta-
ble 1 shows how they would fare if they were seeking 
entry now (but uses as a benchmark the euro area 
inflation  rate,  as  proposed  in  the  previous  para-
graph, along with the euro area average of long-term 
interest rates). In 2002, all eight countries listed in 
table 1 had stocks of debt no larger than 60 per-
cent of GDP, and four had budget deficits no larger 
than 3 percent of GDP. In mid-2003, moreover, five 
of the six that issue long-term government bonds 
had interest rates below the relevant benchmark. 
But three countries were still far from meeting the 
inflation benchmark. All of the accession countries 
have reduced their inflation rates dramatically since 
the mid-1990s, as shown in table 2, but Hungary, 
Slovakia,  and  Slovenia  must  continue  to  reduce 
them.9 
Furthermore, risks lie ahead. EU membership 
will put new pressures on the government budgets 
of the accession countries. They must contribute to 
the EU budget and must conform to the require-
ments of EU legislation, the acquis communautaire, 
which will force them to increase their spending on 
infrastructure and environmental quality. They will, 
of course, qualify for financial assistance from the 
European Union itself, but it will impose cofinanc-
ing requirements. According to estimates cited by 
Jürgen  von  Hagen  and  Zizhong  Zhou  (2003),  EU 






as percent of GDP (2000) Long-term
interest rate
(June 2003)
Czech Republic 0.0 –3.9* 27.1* 3.79
Estonia 0.4 1.3 5.8 n.a.
Hungary 4.4 –9.2 56.3 6.69
Latvia 3.7 –3.0 15.2 n.a.
Lithuania –0.3 –2.0 22.7 4.25a
Poland 0.6 –4.1 41.8 5.07
Slovakia 8.7 –7.2 42.6 4.79
Slovenia 6.2  –2.6 28.3 3.86a
Euro area 
comparator 
3.5b –3.0c 60.0c 5.93d
* = preliminary
n.a. = not available
HICP = Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
a. Euro-denominated issue.
b. Average for euro area countries plus 1.5 percent.
c. Reference values from Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
d. Average for euro area countries plus 2 percent.
Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Eurostat, and Bloomberg.
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Box 2. The Balassa-Samuelson Effect
The  accession  countries  are  undergoing  a  pro-
cess of economic transformation. The progress of 
this process can be measured by comparing the 
per capita income levels of these countries with 
the  average  level  in  the  European  Union.  Most 
accession  countries  have  experienced  advances 
in per capita income since 1993, but a substan-
tial amount of catching up remains to be done 
before they reach the average income level in the 
EU-15  (see  table  below).  This  process  is  apt  to 
raise  their  inflation  rates  insofar  as  it  reflects 
rapid  productivity  growth  in  the  traded  goods 
sector,  a  phenomenon  known  as  the  Balassa-
Samuelson (BS) effect. 
Index of GDP per capita in accession 
countries (EU-15=100; purchasing power stan-
dard)
Country 1993 2002








Sources: Eurostat and Begg et al. (2003).
To  derive  the  BS  effect,  consider  two  countries 
(advanced  and  transition),  each  with  two  sec-
tors  (traded  and  nontraded  goods).  The  catch-
up process involves a rapid rate of productivity 
growth in the transition country’s traded goods 
sector—more rapid than in its nontraded sector 
or in the advanced country. This rapid produc-
tivity  growth  in  the  transition  country’s  traded 
goods sector results in an increase in wages in 
that sector. Under the assumption that wages are 
equalized across sectors, the rise in wages in the 
transition country’s traded goods sector pushes 
up  wages  in  the  nontraded  goods  sector  and, 
with no productivity growth there, results in an 
increase in prices of nontraded goods.
Thus,  productivity  growth  from  the  catch-
up process generates relatively higher prices for 
nontraded goods in the transition country. This 
implies  that  the  transition  country  will  experi-
ence some real appreciation of its exchange rate. 
Using one conventional definition of the real ex-
change rate—the ratio of nontraded goods prices 
to traded goods prices—this real appreciation re-
sults directly from relatively greater inflation in 
the nontraded goods sector. Using another con-
ventional  definition  of  the  real  exchange  rate—
the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative 
price levels—and assuming further that prices of 
traded goods are equalized on world markets and 
that the transition country is a small supplier on 
these markets (so that the increase in supply of 
traded goods resulting from catch-up productiv-
ity growth does not depress the price of traded 
goods),  the  real  appreciation  results  from  the 
rise in nontraded goods inflation in the transi-
tion  country  (taking  into  account  the  share  of 
nontraded goods in the relevant price index).
A  number  of  authors  have  endeavored  to 
estimate  the  magnitude  of  the  BS  effect  in  ac-
cession countries; results from these studies are 
summarized in Buiter and Grafe (2002), Kovács 
(2003), and von Hagen and Zhou (2003). Without 
adjusting for differences in study methodology, 
however,  it  is  difficult  to  compare  estimates 
across  studies.  The  results  can  depend  impor-
tantly  on  whether  a  particular  study  examines 
countries  individually  or  as  a  group,  on  the 
similarity of data and measurement techniques 
across studies, and on the price index used (and 
the share of nontraded goods in it). Mihály An-
drás Kovács (2003) addresses these comparabili-
ty issues in two ways: first, he reports work from 
a  joint  study  that  used  similar  methodologies 
and data to assess the BS effect in five accession 
countries  (Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia); and second, he adjusts 
results  from  other  studies  so  as  to  make  the 
estimates  as  comparable  as  possible.  The  bulk 
of the estimates in Kovács’s study suggest that 
BS inflation in the accession countries is on the 
order of 2 percent per year, similar to the effects 
reported for Spain and smaller countries in the 
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membership could raise the budget deficits of the 
accession countries by amounts as large as 3 or 4 
percent of GDP. Even if the actual amounts turn out 
to be smaller, they pose a serious problem for those 
accession countries that have still to cut their bud-
get deficits sharply. Attention must also be paid to 
the need for further real convergence of the acces-
sion countries and the implications of that process.
Most discussions of this matter begin by not-
ing that there is a large gap between the levels of 
income per capita in the accession countries and 
in  other  EU  countries.  It  is  smaller  now  than  in 
1993 (see box 2) but is still substantial. The gap is 
therefore cited to stress the need for the accession 
countries to improve the functioning of their econo-
mies—to liberalize markets and prices, strengthen 
competition policies, and foster the development of 
their financial systems.10
Yet there is another important dimension to the 
problem. It is the risk that the further growth of the 
accession countries’ economies will jeopardize their 
ability to hold down their inflation rates. This risk 
derives from the functioning of the Balassa-Samu-
elson effect, described in box 2. Briefly, it poses the 
threat that the prices of nontraded goods will rise 
faster than the prices of traded goods—which are 
held down by prices in world markets—and that the 
increase in the prices of nontraded goods will raise 
the general price level, relative to foreign price lev-
els. In other words, the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
causes the real exchange rate to appreciate.
This appreciation is unavoidable. It is an equi-
librium phenomenon. Most of the accession coun-
tries have indeed experienced substantial amounts 
of real appreciation (figure 1).11 There are neverthe-
less two ways in which it can manifest itself: an in-
12 Those who urge the accession countries to adopt the euro 
unilaterally and thus forgo the option of nominal appreciation 
acknowledge that their recommendation could jeopardize the 
ability of the accession countries to achieve the degree of price 
stability required for EMU entry. Therefore, they suggest that 
the European Union should waive the price-stability require-
ment insofar as a country’s inflation rate can be ascribed to 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect or should recast that require-
ment by looking only at traded-goods inflation; see Bratkowski 
and Rostowski (2002a, 2002b), and Buiter and Grafe (2002). 
Although Padoa-Schioppa (2003) opposes unilateral euroization, 
he likewise acknowledges that price increases reflecting the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect should not be viewed as violations of 
price stability, but he doubts the feasibility of identifying clearly 
the statistical counterpart of the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
crease in the domestic price level, or an increase in 
the price of the domestic currency—an appreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate. That is why most dis-
cussions of the Balassa-Samuelson effect say that it 
poses a choice for the accession countries. They can 
opt for an increase in their inflation rates, which 
may jeopardize their ability to meet the price sta-
bility requirement described in box 1, or opt for an 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which 
may jeopardize their ability to meet the exchange 
rate  requirement.  Few  discussions,  however,  ex-
plain how the accession countries can exercise this 
choice—how they can engineer the nominal appre-
ciation required to preclude an increase in the infla-
tion rate. In order to do that, they must pursue tight 
monetary  policies  to  hold  down  the  general  price 
level and count on the resulting increase of domes-
tic interest rates to attract capital inflows that will, 
in turn, drive up the price of the domestic currency 
on the foreign-exchange market.12
Euroization has been ruled out by the EU 
authorities as being “inconsistent with the 
rationale of EMU.” One reason has to do 
with the euro conversion rate at which 
a country enters EMU, which, like the 
exchange rate chosen for entering ERM II, 
must be approved by the EU authorities. 
The second objection reflects the European 
Union’s views about the integrity of the 
convergence process.
10 On these matters, see, e.g., Redonnet (2002), Padoa-Schiop-
pa (2003), and Stark (2003), all of whom stress the progress 
already made by the accession countries and warn against 
using the income gap to measure the need for more structural 
adjustment. The accession countries, says Padoa-Schioppa 
(2003, 133), “are considerably more similar to EU member 
states than suggested by per capita income levels alone,” and 
he draws attention to the fact that the accession countries have 
grown faster than the euro area countries during the global eco-
nomic slowdown—a fact confirmed by the data on GDP growth 
shown in table 2. All three authors, however, stress the need to 
strengthen financial systems and prudential supervision; see 
also Begg et al. (2003), von Hagen and Zhou (2003), and the 
discussion in Baudino et al. (2003) of the role of foreign banks 
in the accession countries.
11 In most cases, however, the amounts of real appreciation 
exceeded the amounts that can be ascribed to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, given the size of that effect cited in box 2. 
Here are the annual percentage rates at which their currencies 
appreciated in real terms over the eight-year period ending in 
2002: Lithuania (6.26), Estonia (4.67), Poland (3.79), Latvia 
(3.67), Czech Republic (3.62), Hungary (3.57), Slovakia (1.39), 
and Slovenia (0.47).Number PB03-9 October 2003 8
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Unfortunately,  this  policy  prescription  poses 
two problems, apart from the possibility that a tight 
monetary policy will depress real economic activity 
and slow the growth of GDP. Its feasibility depends 
on the amount of exchange rate flexibility allowed 
by the exchange rate requirement for EMU entry. 
Its soundness depends on the willingness of the ac-
cession  countries  to  expose  themselves  to  capital 
inflows and the potential volatility of those inflows—
which  brings  us  right  back  to  the  matter  of  ex-
change rate flexibility. The accession countries have 
already experienced large inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). They have not experienced com-
parable inflows of portfolio investment, which tend 
to be more volatile. In fact, the volatility of portfolio 
flows and of other short-term capital flows has been 
a major cause of the currency and financial crises 
that have beset many emerging-market countries in 
recent years, and it is widely agreed that insufficient 
exchange rate flexibility has been a root cause of 
their vulnerability to that volatility. When entering 
the European Union in 2004, moreover, the acces-
sion countries must dismantle all of their remaining 
controls on cross-border capital flows.
The Balassa-Samuelson effect and the impend-
ing liberalization of capital account flows have im-
portant implications for the exchange rate policies 
of  the  accession  countries  in  the  years  between 
EU accession and EMU entry. They likewise have 
important  implications  for  the  way  in  which  the 
European  Union  should  interpret  the  exchange 
rate requirement for EMU entry. This policy brief 
deals first with the interpretation of the exchange 
rate requirement, then with the ways in which the 
accession countries should manage their national 
currencies before they enter EMU.
The Key Role of the Exchange Rate 
Requirement
In 1991, when the Maastricht Treaty was draft-
ed, ten of the twelve EU members adhered to ERM 
I.13 Each one was required to keep its exchange rate 
within a narrow band by purchasing its currency 
in  the  foreign-exchange  market  to  keep  its  cur-
rency from depreciating by more than 21⁄4 percent 
vis-à-vis the strongest currency. The obligation was 
symmetrical, moreover, in that the strong-currency 
country  was  required  to  sell  its  currency  in  the 
foreign-exchange market to keep its currency from 
appreciating further or, alternatively, to lend unlim-
ited amounts of its currency to the weak-currency 
country in order to finance that country’s purchases 
of its own currency. The 21⁄4 percent band thus de-
fined the “normal fluctuation margins” cited in Ar-
ticle 121 of the Treaty (quoted in box 1).
In 1992, however, a currency crisis erupted in 
Europe, beginning with an attack on the Italian lira 
and spreading quickly to other currencies. Italy and 
Britain were forced to drop out of ERM I, and some 
of the other participating countries were forced to 
devalue their currencies. In July 1993, moreover, 
the  French  franc  came  under  strong  speculative 
pressure, and the remaining participants in ERM 
I agreed to widen the fluctuation margins from 21⁄4 
percent  all  the  way  to  15  percent.  This  was  por-
trayed as a temporary measure, not as a permanent 
change in the normal margins. 
When  therefore  it  was  time  to  decide  which 
countries  were  eligible  to  enter  EMU,  the  Euro-
pean  Commission  based  its  assessment  on  their 
adherence to the normal margins of ERM I, while 
conceding the validity of “the presumption that the 
wider margins could be exploited, at least temporar-
ily” (European Commission 1998). There were very 
few  instances,  however,  in  which  a  currency  had 
strayed far from the normal band. The Italian lira 
had done so briefly but only in the early part of the 
relevant two-year period, before Italy had re-entered 
ERM I. The Irish punt had done so persistently, but 
by  appreciating  rather  than  depreciating.  Hence, 
the commission concluded that all of the countries 
then being assessed for EMU entry had met the ex-
change rate criterion.14
The European Commission should recast 
the benchmarks used to assess compliance 
with the inflation-rate and interest-rate 
requirements. These should be based on the 
inflation rate and average long-term interest 
rate prevailing in the euro area, not those 
prevailing in the “three best-performing” 
EU countries. 
13 Greece and Portugal had not yet adhered to ERM I, and three 
of the countries adhering to it (Britain, Italy, and Spain) were 
allowed to employ a 6 percent band rather than the normal 21⁄4 
percent band. 
14 By that time, the European Union had 15 members, but 
Greece did not adhere to ERM I until March 1998, while Den-
mark and the United Kingdom had exercised their opt-outs 
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In 1997, however, the EU countries had decided 
that, once EMU was in being, ERM I would be re-
placed by a new arrangement, ERM II. It would in-
volve the ECB and be based on “standard” margins 
of 15 percent on each side of an agreed central rate 
vis-à-vis the euro.15 Two countries, Denmark and 
Greece, adhered to this arrangement, which entered 
into force in January 1999, concurrently with EMU. 
This new regime posed a problem for the commis-
sion when it had to assess the eligibility of Greece, 
which had entered ERM I in March 1998 but had 
adhered to ERM II in January 1999 and was thus 
subject to the 15 percent band thereafter. Although 
the  commission  took  note  of  the  new  “standard” 
band, as well as the widening of the ERM I band 
in 1993, it decided without any extended explana-
tion to apply the 21⁄4 percent “normal” band when 
assessing the behavior of the Greek drachma. The 
drachma was outside that narrow band for much 
of the period under review but, like the Irish punt, 
it was strong, not weak. The commission therefore 
concluded that Greece had met the exchange rate 
requirement for EMU membership.
Why  is  this  history  relevant  now?  Precisely 
because it has been forgotten. Academics and EU 
officials  alike  have  told  the  accession  countries 
that they can and should avail themselves of the 
exchange rate flexibility afforded by ERM II, not only 
to achieve the nominal appreciations that may be 
required to keep the Balassa-Samuelson effect from 
raising  their  inflation  rates  and  preventing  them 
from meeting the inflation criterion but also to cope 
with the volatility of cross-border capital flows and 
with other shocks.16 And though officials have often 
invoked the principle of equal treatment, they have 
not spelled out its implications for the assessment 
of exchange rate stability. In fact, only one exception 
has come to our attention. In a note on the report of 
the ECOFIN Council to the 2000 Nice Summit (Eu-
ropean Commission 2001), Denis Redonnet made 
this strong statement:
Following the principle of equal treatment, ex-
change rate stability for future Member States 
will be judged against significant variations from 
the narrow bands around the central parity, and 
not against the wide standard bands. In light of 
the Irish precedent, however, pressures towards 
appreciation or re-valuation are less of a prob-
lem. (Redonnet 2002, 10; emphasis in original)
But this was his personal view. It was not stated 
or clearly implied in the ECOFIN Council report he 
was discussing.17
Then  came  Pedro  Solbes’s  statement,  cited  at 
the  start  of  this  policy  brief,  which  changed  dra-
matically the trade-offs and options facing the ac-
cession countries. They must join ERM II to qualify 
for EMU entry, but they cannot exploit the flexibility 
it affords to cope with the price pressures produced 
by  the  Balassa-Samuelson  effect  or  the  exchange 
rate pressures resulting from volatile capital flows. 
Unless the European Commission decides to inter-
pret “equal treatment” in a more sensible way, tak-
ing account of the fact that the normal band of ERM 
I could not survive the exchange rate turbulence of 
1992–93 and had to be replaced by the standard 
band of ERM II, the accession countries will find 
themselves facing the same problem as the child in 
the ancient rhyme:
Mother, may I go out to swim?
Yes, my darling daughter,
Hang your clothes on a hickory limb, 
But don’t go near the water!
The accession countries must not defy mother’s 
warning. When the European Commission decided 
in 1998 to use the 21⁄4 percent band for assessing 
the eligibility of the first group of countries seek-
ing  EMU  membership,  it  did  so  retrospectively. 
Therefore, its decision could not affect market par-
ticipants’ expectations about the probability that a 
17 Redonnet also asserts that most accession countries “envis-
age a form of participation in the ERM II which would not make 
use of the flexibility built into the mechanism. This is the case 
for the possibility to realign, but also for the use of standard 
bands” (Redonnet 2002, 10). If this were true, it would be hard 
to understand the furor created by Pedro Solbes’s subsequent 
statement predicting use of the 21⁄4 percent band for assessing 
exchange rate stability.
15 The new regime was established by a 1997 resolution of the 
European Council, and its features were spelled out in a 1998 
agreement between the ECB and the national central banks 
of the countries outside the euro area; both documents are 
reprinted in ECB (1999). Article 2.5 of the council’s resolution 
says that the standard bands “shall not prejudice” the interpre-
tation of the exchange rate convergence criterion in Article 121 
of the Treaty. We have searched in vain for any reference to this 
sentence in subsequent official documents, although it would 
appear to provide the juridical basis for the commission’s 2000 
decision regarding Greece, discussed in the next sentences of 
the text.
16 Among the academics, see, e.g., Begg et al. (2003) and Wyplo-
sz (forthcoming 2004) who fear that the wide “standard” band 
may not afford enough flexibility to cope with volatile capital 
flows once capital controls are dismantled completely, and von 
Hagen and Zhou (2002) who produce calculations showing that 
fluctuations in the exchange rates of the accession countries 
have typically exceeded those allowed by the “normal” band but 
not those allowed by the “standard” band. Among the officials, 
see Solans (2002), Padoa-Schioppa (2003), and Stark (2003).Number PB03-9 October 2003 11
Table 2. Indicators of macroeconomic performance, 1995–2002
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Consumer price inflation, national indexes
Czech Republic 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 1.8*
Estonia 29.1 23.1 11.2 8.1 3.3 4.0 5.8 3.6*
Hungary 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.2 4.8*
Latvia 25.0 17.6 8.4 4.7 2.4 2.6 2.5 1.9*
Lithuania 39.6 24.6 8.9 5.1 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.3*
Poland 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 10.1 5.5 1.7*
Slovakia 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 12.0 7.3 3.3*
Slovenia 13.5 9.9 8.4 7.9 6.1 8.9 8.4 7.5*
Growth rate of real GDP
Czech Republic 5.9 4.3 –0.8 –1.0 0.5 3.3 3.1 2.0
Estonia 4.3 3.9 9.8 4.6 –0.6 7.1 5.0 5.0
Hungary 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.3
Latvia –0.8 3.7 8.4 4.8 2.8 6.8 7.9 6.1
Lithuania 3.3 4.7 7.3 5.1 –3.9 3.8 5.9 5.9
Poland 6.8 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.0 1.3
Slovakia 6.5 5.8 5.6 4.0 1.3 2.2 3.3 4.4
Slovenia 4.9 3.5 4.6 3.8 5.2 4.6 3.0 2.9
Current account deficit as percent of GDP
Czech Republic 2.6 7.1 6.7 2.2 2.7 5.3 4.6 5.3
Estonia 4.4 9.2 12.1 9.2 4.7 5.7 6.2 12.6
Hungary 5.6 3.7 2.1 4.9 4.3 2.8 2.2 4.2
Latvia 0.4 5.5 6.1 10.7 9.8 6.9 9.5 7.8
Lithuania 9.9 9.2 10.2 11.9 11.2 6.0 4.8 4.8
Poland –4.5 1.0 3.2 4.4 7.5 6.3 4.0 3.6
Slovakia –2.1 10.6 9.6 9.7 5.5 3.7 8.8 8.2
Slovenia 0.4 –0.3 –0.3 0.6 3.5 3.0 –0.2 –1.8
* = preliminary.
Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and International Monetary Fund.Number PB03-9 October 2003 12
particular country would qualify to enter EMU. That 
was  likewise  true  in  the  case  of  Greece,  because 
market participants could not know in advance that 
the commission would decline to use the standard 
15 percent band of ERM II that was then applicable 
to the Greek drachma. In the present case by con-
trast,  the  commission’s  intentions  will  be  known 
in advance, unless it decides and announces soon 
that it will abandon the precedent set in the Greek 
case and apply the 15 percent band when assessing 
the eligibility of the accession countries. Therefore, 
market participants’ expectations will be affected if 
an accession country’s currency breaches the 21⁄4 
percent band after the country adheres to ERM II, 
and the accession countries will not be free to ex-
ploit the flexibility afforded by the 15 percent band.
To complicate matters, the accession countries 
cannot count on help from the ECB in keeping their 
currencies within the 21⁄4 percent band. Under ERM 
II, the ECB is not obliged to intervene or provide 
short-term  financing  unless  a  participating  cur-
rency has reached the edge of its 15 percent band 
vis-à-vis  the  euro.18  And  there  is  also  the  risk  of 
contagion. If the currency of one accession country 
breaches the 21⁄4 percent band, market participants 
are apt to revise their expectations about the EMU 
outlook, not only for that country but also for other 
countries.  Finally,  a  country  courting  a  currency 
crisis by failing to keep its currency within the 21⁄4 
percent band may also face a banking crisis.19
 
Options for the Accession Countries
Assume that compliance with the exchange rate 
criterion will be evaluated on the basis of the 21⁄4 
percent  band  and  that  the  evaluation  procedure 
will be well understood in financial markets.  What 
options are then open to the accession countries? 
Deviations from the central rate, particularly in a 
downward  direction,  will  put  them  at  risk  of  vio-
lating that criterion, and there is little margin for 
error with such narrow bands. Although a country 
may adopt a 15 percent band, market participants 
will know that the European Commission plans to 
evaluate the country’s performance on the basis of 
a much stricter test, and they, in turn will assess 
its chances of entering EMU in light of its ability to 
pass that test.
This section describes the current exchange rate 
regimes of the accession countries and their experi-
ence with capital flows, then turns to an evaluation 
of  currency  boards  and  unilateral  euroization  as 
regimes that may serve as sensible substitutes for 
participation in ERM II, discussing in some detail 
EU objections to unilateral euroization.
The accession countries have run large current-
account deficits in recent years (table 2), and these 
have been financed by large net capital inflows rela-
tive to GDP (table 3). Thus far, FDI has dominated 
those capital inflows, but the size and composition 
of capital flows may change in the years ahead. As 
the accession countries dismantle their remaining 
restrictions on capital movements, as required by 
the acquis communautaire, they are likely to attract 
larger amounts of portfolio investment, which tends 
to be more volatile than direct investment. There-
fore, they run the risk that capital inflows will dry 
up or reverse abruptly, and this risk will be magni-
fied if they adopt exchange rate arrangements that 
invite market participants to make costless one-way 
bets  on  future  exchange  rate  changes.  Reviewing 
the experience with capital flows and financial cri-
ses in the 1990s, Begg et al. (2003) suggest that the 
onset and virulence of the 1992 ERM crisis reflected 
the intrinsic fragility of ERM I, with its narrow band, 
combined with the increase in the size and volatil-
ity of capital flows resulting from adherence to the 
Single European Act, which required the lifting of all 
capital controls by 1990. 
Current  practices  in  the  accession  countries 
with respect to exchange rate and monetary poli-
cies  are  summarized  in  table  4.  At  present,  four 
countries—the  Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Slovakia, 
and Slovenia—have floating exchange rates and are 
therefore completely outside the framework of ERM 
II. Their participation in ERM II would necessitate 
a reorientation of their monetary policies in order 
to target exchange rate stability, and this may be a 
The exchange rate requirement should 
be assessed by applying the 15 percent 
standard band of ERM II, not the 21⁄4 
percent normal band of ERM I. 
18 See Article 3 of the 1998 agreement reprinted in ECB (1999). 
The ECB is not precluded from engaging in intramarginal inter-
vention or providing short-term financing for such intervention, 
but is not required to do so. Under Article 15, however, the ECB 
can agree formally to a request by the other country concerned 
to adopt a band narrower than 15 percent, in which case the 
ECB is obliged to intervene when that country’s currency 
reaches the edge of the narrower band. Danish participation in 
ERM II is governed by an agreement of that sort, but no one has 
advised the accession countries to exercise that option, which 
would deprive them of any significant exchange rate flexibility. 
19 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) found that banking crises 
frequently cause currency crises, but many currency crises also 
produce banking crises, especially when a country’s banks have 
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20 Following the Solbes statement, however, some officials in the 
accession countries have been rethinking their support for the 
early EMU entry scenario. See “Patience, patience: Don’t rush 
into the euro, central bankers say,” The Economist (July 24, 
2003). 
more difficult adjustment than the one facing other 
accession countries that already use the exchange 
rate as a nominal anchor. Currency boards in Esto-
nia and Lithuania are at the other end of the spec-
trum of exchange rate regimes, along with Latvia’s 
strict peg to the SDR (the unit of account of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund). Those “hard” regimes 
can be fitted into ERM II, a matter discussed later. 
Hungary’s exchange rate regime already resembles 
ERM  II;  the  forint  fluctuates  within  a  15  percent 
band  on  each  side  of  a  central  rate  vis-à-vis  the 
euro. In fact, Buiter and Grafe (2002) describe Hun-
gary as “shadowing” ERM II. During much of 2003, 
however, Hungary has experienced intense curren-
cy speculation and volatile capital flows, reflecting 
the inconsistency between its target for the forint 
and its target for inflation—a problem similar to the 
one posed by the need for the accession countries 
to satisfy simultaneously the convergence criterion 
pertaining to price stability and the one pertaining 
to exchange rate stability. 
One option for the accession countries, particu-
larly those with floating exchange rates, is to retain 
their  current  exchange  rate  arrangements  for  the 
foreseeable  future  and  thus  delay  attempting  to 
conform to the requirements of ERM II. This is the 
scenario  favored  by  many  EU  officials,  who  have 
urged the accession countries to put EMU member-
ship on the back burner until they have traveled 
further down the road to real convergence. Jürgen 
Stark (2003) argues that “the greater flexibility of 
the exchange rate before ERM II entry could be an 
advantage  for  the  acceding  countries,  as  flexible 
rates  offer  a  certain  protection  from  speculative 
capital inflows.” Hence, he cautions those countries 
against moving quickly into ERM II. Otmar Issing 
(2003)  and  Jürgen  Kröger  (2003)  make  the  same 
recommendation. Underlying their advice is an as-
sumption about the time required to achieve real 
convergence. As that process will take much more 
time, it is argued, rapid entry into ERM II followed 
quickly by EMU membership would be premature.
Within  the  accession  countries,  by  contrast, 
there has been strong support for rapid adherence 
to ERM II so as to achieve EMU membership as soon 
as possible after accession. Thus, Leszek Balcero-
wicz (2003) views rapid entry as complementary to 
structural reform, noting “that the idea of introduc-
ing the euro is popular in the accession countries 
as an additional argument in favor of these [struc-
tural] reforms.” On this view, the catching-up pro-
cess would be facilitated by adopting the euro, and 
there are “serious risks of staying outside the EMU” 
because the volatility of capital flows and exchange 
rates “would complicate the conditions for economic 
growth.”20
Table 3. Net capital inflows (percent of GDP)
Country 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic 13.9 13.0 12.9
Estonia 8.0 7.9 5.7
Hungary 9.9 4.7 1.2
Latvia 11.6 6.9 12.4
Lithuania 9.9 6.2 6.5
Poland 5.6 5.4 2.5
Slovakia 8.7 7.6 n.a.
Slovenia 2.9 3.8 6.4
n.a. = not available
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Table 4. Exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks
As of December 31, 2001
Country Exchange rate regime Monetary policy 
framework
Current practice
Czech Republic Independent float Inflation target No change since 2001
Estonia
Currency board 
based on the euro, 
1 euro = 15.6466 kroons
Exchange rate target No change since 2001
Hungary
Peg to euro within 
horizontal band, 
central parity 
1 euro = 276.1 forints, 
band width of +/– 15 
percent
Exchange rate target, 
inflation target
Central parity changed in 
June 2003, 
1 euro = 282.36 forints
Latvia
Conventional peg to 
the SDR, 
1 SDR = 0.7997 lats
Exchange rate target No change since 2001
Lithuania
Currency board based on 
the US dollar, 
1 US dollar = 4 litas
Exchange rate target Currency board based on 
the euro since 
February 2002,
1 euro = 3.4528 litas
Poland Independent float Inflation target No change since 2001
Slovakia Managed float 
No explicit nominal 
anchor; monitors 
variety of indicators
No change since 2001
Slovenia Managed float  Monetary aggregate target No change since 2001
SDR = special drawing rights
Sources: International Monetary Fund and national central banks.Number PB03-9 October 2003 15
If the goal is to enter EMU as soon as possible 
after accession in May 2004, how soon could it be 
achieved?  The  assessments  of  convergence  with 
respect  to  inflation,  fiscal  policy,  and  long-term 
interest rates require a single year’s data. The as-
sessment  of  exchange  rate  convergence,  however, 
applies to the two-year period preceding the assess-
ment, although the treatment accorded to Finland 
and Italy in 1998 suggests that a somewhat shorter 
period may suffice in the case of a country that will 
have spent two full years in ERM II prior to actual 
EMU entry.21 Putting it all together, an accession 
country that adheres to ERM II in the fall of 2004 
could qualify for assessment in the spring of 2006 
and,  with  adequate  preparation,  could  adopt  the 
euro in January 2007.
What then is the best strategy for a country that 
wishes to adhere to ERM II in 2004? For a country 
to enter ERM II with the implied obligation to keep 
its currency within a 21⁄4 percent band would be like 
donning a straightjacket. The country might be un-
able to achieve the price stability required to enter 
EMU because it could not permit its currency to ap-
preciate sufficiently to keep the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect from raising its inflation rate. But this is not 
the most worrisome problem. In the Irish and Greek 
cases, the European Commission was rather toler-
ant of currency appreciation and, in the Irish case, 
of outright revaluation. Like Charles Wyplosz,22 we 
attach much greater weight to the familiar problems 
posed by a narrowly pegged exchange rate. It can-
not help an economy adjust to exogenous shocks, 
including fluctuations in capital flows, and it invites 
speculative attacks when market participants start 
to doubt that the currency peg will survive. Thus, 
we  consider  two  possible  alternatives  to  entering 
ERM II in the conventional way—a currency-board 
regime and unilateral euroization.
When  considering  the  merits  of  a  currency 
board,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the 
Baltic  countries,  which  already  have  currency 
boards or have come close to having one, and the 
other accession countries, which have very different 
regimes. The Baltic States are small, do not have 
large  financial  markets,  and,  importantly,  have 
probably  earned  the  credibility  required  to  safe-
guard a currency board against speculative attack. 
Furthermore,  EU  officials  are  prepared  to  treat  a 
currency board as a regime consistent with adher-
ence to ERM II. They view it as constituting “a uni-
lateral decision augmenting the relevant countries’ 
obligations under ERM II while not implying addi-
tional commitments for the ECB” (Solans 2002).
This official endorsement may owe much to the 
fact that the Baltic countries with currency boards 
have had long-lasting success with them, and the 
EU  authorities  are  therefore  hesitant  to  ask  that 
they undertake a “double regime shift” in order to 
join EMU. Yet there is another reason to endorse 
a currency board as being consistent with ERM II. 
It does not deprive the EU authorities of their legal 
right to approve the central rate at which a country 
enters ERM II. As Solbes (2003) puts it, “The new 
Member State wishing to keep the currency board 
will  be  subject  to  the  common  procedure  estab-
lished by the European Council Resolution of June 
1997 on the establishment of ERM II, which means 
that the central rate parity will have to be agreed 
multilaterally.” As a practical matter, however, any 
change in the parity, whether on entering ERM II 
or  thereafter,  could  impair  the  credibility  already 
earned by a currency board. 
A move to a currency board, however, may not 
meet  the  needs  of  other  accession  countries  that 
have more sizable financial markets and more flex-
ible exchange rates. A newly created currency board 
would not earn instantaneous credibility and could 
therefore be inferior to an even stricter regime—uni-
lateral euroization. Because it is virtually irrevers-
ible, euroization would serve as a device to borrow 
credibility from the ECB—the issuer of the euro. For 
this and other reasons, unilateral euroization has 
been advocated by Andrzej Bratkowski and Jacek 
Rostowski (2002b) for Poland and by Willem Buiter 
and Clemens Grafe (2002) more generally, as a way 
The larger accession countries should 
delay their adherence to ERM II until 
they are confident that they are ready to 
satisfy quickly all of the other convergence 
criteria—pertaining to price stability, fiscal 
sustainability, and long-term interest rates—
in order to minimize the amount of time in 
which they will be at risk of breaching the 
exchange rate criterion.
21 Finland entered ERM I in October 1996 and Italy reentered 
it in November 1996, 15 and 16 months, respectively, before 
the evaluation of March 1998. Buiter and Grafe (2002) and von 
Hagen and Zhou (2003) have also noted this distinction between 
the two-year Treaty requirement and the somewhat shorter stay 
before the evaluation.
22 See “Do Not Impose a Currency Crisis on Europe,” Financial 
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station  between  a  floating  exchange  rate  and  full 
EMU membership. Yet euroization has been ruled 
out  by  the  EU  authorities  as  being  “inconsistent 
with the rationale of EMU” (Solans 2002).
One  possible  reason  for  the  objection  to  uni-
lateral euroization has to do with the choice of the 
euro conversion rate. Like the exchange rate chosen 
for entering ERM II, the conversion rate at which a 
country enters EMU must be approved by the EU 
authorities.  Yet  this  requirement  could  be  met  if 
euroization were to occur as an agreed alternative 
to joining ERM II—what Buiter and Grafe (2002) de-
scribe as “consensual” euroization. The EU authori-
ties could be asked to approve the equivalent of the 
ERM II central rate (i.e., the rate at which euroiza-
tion would take place) on the explicit understand-
ing that this would likewise be the conversion rate 
at which the country would enter EMU later. (Al-
though different procedures and bodies are involved 
in making the two decisions, there is no insuperable 
obstacle to integrating them.) A subsequent revalu-
ation would not be feasible under this arrangement, 
but would be equally difficult in the case of a cur-
rency board. In short, the European Union’s need 
to maintain control over the euro conversion rate is 
not a compelling obstacle.23
The European Union has raised a second objec-
tion  to  euroization,  reflecting  its  views  about  the 
integrity of the convergence process:
. . . any unilateral adoption of the single cur-
rency  by  means  of  “euroisation”  would  run 
counter to the underlying economic reasoning of 
EMU in the Treaty, which foresees the eventual 
adoption of the euro as the endpoint of a struc-
tured convergence process within a multilateral 
framework (European Commission 2001, 2; em-
phasis added).
This  policy  brief  has  taken  a  different,  more 
pragmatic view of the rationale for the convergence 
process. It was meant to ensure that the countries 
joining EMU would bear the costs of adjustment pri-
or to EMU entry rather than shifting that cost onto 
the nascent euro area. The European Commission’s 
view, by contrast, implies that the convergence pro-
cess is meritorious in itself, although circumstances 
are different today than they were before EMU be-
gan. We find it somewhat odd, moreover, that EU 
members are barred from adopting the euro with-
out  partaking  of  that  process,  whereas  countries 
outside the European Union are free in principle to 
adopt the euro. It may be appropriate to insist that 
EU  members  achieve  convergence  before  entering 
EMU,  acquiring  influence  over  ECB  policies,  and 
expecting the ECB to add them fully to its policy 
domain. It is less obviously appropriate to bar them 
from adopting the euro unilaterally.
Recommendations
Earlier parts of this brief made several recom-
mendations. Some were addressed to the European 
Union and, in the first instance, the European Com-
mission. Others were addressed to the governments 
of the accession countries. Here is a summary:
The European Union should modify the way in 
which it applies the principle of equal treatment to 
take explicit account of the important difference be-
tween conditions prevailing before EMU came into 
being and those prevailing today:
(1)  It  should  recast  the  benchmarks  used  to 
assess  compliance  with  the  inflation-rate  and 
interest-rate requirements contained in Article 
121 of the Maastricht Treaty. These should be 
based  on  the  inflation  rate  and  average  long-
term interest rate prevailing in the euro area, 
not those prevailing in the “three best-perform-
ing” EU countries. 
(2) Now that ERM II has replaced ERM I, the 
exchange rate requirement contained in Article 
121  should  be  assessed  by  applying  the  15 
percent standard band of ERM II, not the 21⁄4 
percent normal band of ERM I. To persist in the 
practice adopted heretofore would deny the ac-
cession countries full use of the standard band 
when, as required, they adhere to ERM II in or-
der to qualify for EMU entry.
These  recommendations  may  require  amend-
ments to the text and protocols of the Maastricht 
Treaty.24  The  small  number  of  changes  needed, 
however, could be made quickly by the intergovern-
mental conference (IGC) that will soon convene to 
consider the new EU Constitution drafted under the 
leadership of Valery Giscard d’Estaing. The amend-
24 Article 6 of the Protocol on the Convergence Criteria says that 
the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously, shall adopt lan-
guage to replace the protocol itself, and some have taken this to 
mean that changes like those proposed in the numbered para-
graphs above could be made without amending the language of 
the Treaty itself. But that is not true, because some of the rel-
evant language in the present protocol replicates language used 
in Article 121 of the Treaty, and it would thus be necessary to 
modify that language too.  
23 von Hagen and Zhou (2003) have also objected to the incon-
sistency of opposing euroization on these jurisdictional grounds 
while endorsing the use of a currency board based on a rigidly 
fixed exchange rate that is almost certain to serve as the con-
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25 The ECB has already proposed that the IGC amend the 
exchange rate criterion quoted in box 1. Instead of requiring 
“the observance of the normal fluctuation margins. . ., without 
devaluing against the currency of any other Member State,” the 
ECB would require “participation in the exchange-rate mecha-
nism for at least two years without severe tensions, in particu-
lar without devaluing against the euro” (ECB 2003).  Deletion 
of the reference to the “normal” margins might be deemed to 
undermine the case for applying those narrow margins to the 
accession countries.  But the ECB warns explicitly against 
that interpretation, which “would not be in line with the way in 
which the exchange-rate criterion has been applied in the past 
. . . .” In other words, the amendment proposed by the ECB 
would not achieve our objective.
ments, moreover, should apply not only to the ac-
cession  countries  but  also  to  other  EU  countries 
that  have  not  yet  entered  EMU,  such  as  Sweden 
and the United Kingdom.25
If these amendments are adopted, some of the 
accession countries may be able to qualify for EMU 
entry in little more than two years after they join the 
European Union itself in May 2004. If the amend-
ments are not adopted, it may take them much lon-
ger to qualify for EMU entry, mainly because of the 
risks and costs posed by early adherence to ERM II, 
if exchange rate stability is to be assessed using the 
narrow 21⁄4 percent band rather than the wide 15 
percent band of ERM II itself. 
The problem may not be serious for the Baltic 
countries; they can fit their currency-board regimes 
into ERM II without risk of breaching the 21⁄4 per-
cent band. The problem may be very serious for the 
larger accession countries, which are more likely to 
experience sudden fluctuations in capital flows that 
could destabilize their pegged exchange rates. Hun-
gary’s recent experience is particularly relevant; it 
began  “shadowing”  ERM  II  a  couple  of  years  ago 
and has already experienced capital-account fluc-
tuations that have driven the forint beyond the 21⁄4 
percent band.
The larger accession countries should therefore 
delay their adherence to ERM II until they are con-
fident that they are ready to satisfy quickly all of 
the other convergence criteria—those pertaining to 
price stability, fiscal sustainability, and long-term 
interest rates—in order to minimize the amount of 
time in which they will be at risk of breaching the 
exchange  rate  criterion.  It  is  especially  important 
that they reduce their budget deficits because mar-
ket participants are apt to monitor closely the coun-
tries’ progress on that front. It would be imprudent 
and counterproductive for a country to enter ERM 
II and then fail to keep its currency within the nar-
row band. That would greatly impair its credibility, 
and it would then have to make a second attempt 
under adverse circumstances; market participants 
might well believe that it would fail again. Early en-
try might be better, but later would be safer if the 
European  Commission  does  not  adopt  a  different 
way of assessing compliance with the exchange rate 
requirement.Number PB03-9 October 2003 18
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